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The Unique Economic Policy Environment of
Interwar and Postwar America
Michael A. Bernstein*
Significant transformations in the economic policy
environment in the United States have almost always been the
exclusive product of significant turmoil, conflict, and war. Within
the crucible of open rebellion, Abraham Lincoln struggled to
develop an altogether unique set of fiscal, financial, and
procurement practices that served both to further federal
objectives in the Civil War and forever reorient the role and
impact of central government in the nation’s economic life.1 It is
clear that the Lincoln government felt compelled to take
extraordinary action with respect to civil liberties, judicial dueprocess, and civil rights in defense of the Union. Similarly, its
Treasury and War Departments implemented unprecedented
economic policies in pursuit of military victory and the resolute
winning of the peace that would follow.2 The economic practices
thus deployed—most importantly, the imposition of income and
excise taxation, the establishment of a national banking system,
and the issuance of paper money—forever changed Washington’s
presence in the macroeconomy3 and they yielded results that
were powerfully and uniquely tied to the political, commercial,
and social circumstances of their day.4 Quite similarly, almost a
century later, another unique set of political and economic
contexts emerged in American history that would set the stage
for another dramatic and vastly consequential change in the
policymaking practices of the nation’s government. Pondering
those quite special circumstances, spanning the period from the
Great Depression of the twentieth century through the height of

* Departments of History and Economics and Office of Academic Affairs and
Provost, Tulane University.
1 See generally Robert D. Hormats, Abraham Lincoln and the Global Economy,
HARV. BUS. REV., August 2003, at 60.
2 See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR & RECONSTRUCTION
374–83 (1982); see also Stanley L. Engerman, The Economic Impact of the Civil War, 3
EXPLORATIONS ENTREPRENEURIAL HIST. 176, 176–99 (2d. ser. 1966).
3 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877,
at 22–23 (1988).
4 See BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS & POLITICS IN
THE CIVIL WAR 202–07, 226–29, 232–35 (1970).
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the Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union and its allied states,
sets the events and outcomes of the Lincoln era in sharp relief
while also affording a better appreciation of the forces that have
shaped late twentieth century American experience. While the
following derives primarily from several prior works, the content
remains relevant to this discussion of constitutional approaches
to wartime finance and economics, both in the context of the Civil
War and today’s War on Terror.5
America’s greatest depression was not brought to an end by
inspired policy choices. Far from it. World War II achieved what
the New Deal could not. National unemployment fell to only 7
percent by the time of the Japanese naval offensive in the
Hawaiian and Aleutian Islands. America’s formal entry into the
conflict brought almost instantaneous resolution of the nation’s
persistent economic difficulties. A wholly collectivized and
centralized approach—through rationing, price controls, and
federal allocative planning—provided for the kind of reflation
and economic recovery that had seemed so unattainable during
the worst years of the Great Depression itself.
When
unemployment fell to just over one percent in the last year of the
war, it was clear that, while hardly inspired by specific economic
concerns, President Franklin Roosevelt’s “arsenal of democracy”
nevertheless contained rather vivid policy lessons for economists,
politicians, government officials, and the public at large.6
New Deal recovery policy has generally been seen as beset by
a fundamental contradiction between two strategies. That
contradiction was epitomized by the conflict between the
advocates of economic planning within Roosevelt’s inner circle
who celebrated the efficiency and rationality of large-scale
enterprise, and those committed to trust-busting, who
maintained that excessive concentrations of market power in
major sectors of the economy had caused the economic crisis of
the thirties. The result of the contradiction was the strange brew
of New Deal economic policy, the bewildering movement of the
president from a planning initiative to a reform initiative

5 The following, with the exception of the conclusion, is excerpted from MICHAEL A.
BERNSTEIN, A PERILOUS PROGRESS: ECONOMISTS AND PUBLIC PURPOSE IN TWENTIETH
CENTURY AMERICA 74 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001); MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, THE GREAT
DEPRESSION: DELAYED RECOVERY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1929-1939, at 186
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1987); UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DECLINE 15
(Michael A. Bernstein & David E. Adler, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996); Michael A.
Bernstein, A Brief History of the American Economic Association, 67 AM. J. ECON. & SOC.
1007 (2008).
6 MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, A PERILOUS PROGRESS: ECONOMISTS AND PUBLIC
PURPOSE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 74 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter
PERILOUS PROGRESS].
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agenda, and the generally poor record of Roosevelt’s first two
terms with respect to economic recovery.7
Ever the consummate strategist, Roosevelt evaluated
economic policy proposals primarily with reference to electoral
and political impacts, far less with convictions concerning the
logical coherence or intellectual (not to mention professional)
pedigree of the argument. As a result, his economic decisions
tended to be skittish, sometimes timid, and often unpredictable.
Federal government vacillation between the imposition of a
centralized blueprint for recovery, as exemplified by the
Industrial Codes of the National Recovery Administration, and
the prosecution of antitrust tactics to foster a competitive revival
never ceased. Fiscal spending targets were more often than not
simply too low to do the job, and their allotment was driven as
much by hardheaded projections of their influence in the
electoral college as by closely measured multiplier effects on
consumption and investment.8
Consumption and investment behavior played a major part
in the great prosperity of the late forties and fifties. On the
domestic side, reconversion was itself an investment stimulus.
Modernization and deferred replacement projects required
renewed and large deployments of funds. Profound scarcities of
consumer goods, the production of which had been long
postponed by mobilization needs, necessitated major retooling
and expansion efforts. Even fear of potentially high inflation,
emerging in the wake of the dismantling of the price and wage
controls of the war years, prompted many firms to move forward
the date of ambitious and long-term investment projects. On the
foreign side, both individuals and governments were eager to find
a refuge for capital that had been in virtual hiding during the
war itself. Along with a jump in domestic investment, therefore,
a large capital inflow began in the United States in late 1945 and
early 1946.9
Domestic consumption was the second major component of
postwar growth. Bridled demand and high household savings
due to wartime shortages, rationing, and controls, coupled with
the generous wage rates of the high-capacity war economy all
contributed to a dramatic growth in consumer spending at war’s
end. The jump in disposable income was bolstered by the rapid
7 MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: DELAYED RECOVERY AND
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1929-1939, at 186 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1987)
[hereinafter GREAT DEPRESSION].
8 PERILOUS PROGRESS, supra note 6, at 76.
9 UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DECLINE 15 (Michael A. Bernstein &
David E. Adler eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
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reduction in wartime surtaxes and excises that had been a
central part of the federal government’s strategy of war finance.
And the baby boom of the wartime generation expressed itself
economically in high levels of demand for significant items like
appliances, automobiles, and housing.
G.I. Bill benefits
additionally served to increase the demand for housing and such
things as educational services with associated impacts on
construction and other bellwether sectors.10
Foreign demand for the American exports grew rapidly in
the immediate postwar years. In part the needs of devastated
areas could only be met by the one industrial base that had been
nearly untouched by war-related destruction. Explicit policy
commitments to the rebuilding of allied and occupied territories,
such as the Marshall Plan in Europe, also served to increase the
foreign market for the output of American industry. Even so, one
of the most powerful influences on the impressive postwar
growth of the American economy was the unique and special set
of arrangements developed for international trade at the
Monetary and Financial Conference of the United Nations in
1944. Along with the creation of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (known today as the World
Bank) and the International Monetary Fund, the Conference
decided to establish fixed exchange rates between the U.S. dollar
and all other internationally traded currencies. The value of the
dollar was itself set in terms of gold at $35 per ounce. This
installed a benchmark against which the value of all other
currencies was measured. American postwar prosperity and the
benefits of world economic leadership continued throughout most
of the 1950s. The added fiscal stimulus of the Korean War also
played a role in maintaining the high levels of growth and
employment characteristic of the decade.11
Federal research expenditures had increased more than
tenfold between 1938 and 1944, from $68 million to $706 million
per year.12 As Clark Kerr of the University of California had so
accurately and succinctly implied some years later, what had
been the “Land Grant College” funding strategies of the
nineteenth century gave way to the “Federal Grant University”
systems of the twentieth.13 Further stimulated by Russia’s
successful test of an atomic bomb in September 1949 (and of a
“super” or “hydrogen” bomb in the summer of 1953), the coming
of war in the Korean peninsula the following year, and such
10
11
12
13

Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 16.
PERILOUS PROGRESS, supra note 6, at 100.
Id. at 102.
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challenges to America’s aeronautical capabilities as the orbiting
of a Russian earth satellite (the Sputnik) in October 1957,
government support of science and engineering became the basis
of yet a new (and more powerful) “arsenal of democracy.”14
High rates of growth, robust levels of employment, and
stable prices were the standards by which a capitalist society
could demonstrate its advantages over command economies
premised upon socialist or communist designs.
As the
emblematic “Kitchen Debate” between Soviet premier Nikita
Khrushchev and Vice President Richard Nixon had suggested in
1959, winning the cold war involved more than husbanding a
credible nuclear deterrent, deploying fleets, garrisons, and air
wings around the world, and utilizing special forces in
counterinsurgency campaigns. It also required that an economic
system deliver the goods to the people. Prosperity was an
essential weapon in the struggle for the hearts and minds of any
society.
A vigorous national economy was thus essential both to
equip the armed forces and to demonstrate the virtues of
American capitalism. Guns and butter were the protocol; a “New
Economics” could provide the means to that end. Both the
experience of the Great Depression and the challenges of world
war had made clear to a new generation of specialists that the
public sector occupied a crucial niche in the mechanisms of the
national economy.
Properly managed and monitored, the
macroeconomy not only would provision an appropriate quantity
and quality of public goods on its own behalf but also would
afford the private sector the wherewithal to expand output
targets, enhance productivity, and maintain employment.
Interweaving public and private accumulation strategies,
reckoning with the “mixed economy” of the postwar era, denoted
the ascendancy of what was arguably the defining characteristic
of the arguments of John Maynard Keynes. Independent of
specific policy initiatives, Keynesianism represented a new way
of thinking about the economy as a whole, one that dovetailed
with broader governmental objectives tied to the struggle against
Communism. Whatever the intellectual foundations of the
“Keynesian revolution,” its historical moorings were made fast by
the exigencies of the Cold War.15
Recapturing the presidency and the Congress in the election
of 1952 encouraged many Grand Old Party stalwarts in the belief
that the potent Democratic influence of two decades had, at long
14
15

Id.
Id. at 107.
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last, come to an end. Whatever the tenuous nature of their
control on Capitol hill—one seat in the Senate, nine seats in the
House of Representatives—and despite the ideological
moderation of the Dwight Eisenhower, whose national popularity
had prompted some of his champions to indulge fantasies of a
bipartisan presidential endorsement, Republicans viewed with
satisfaction the imminent opportunity to dismantle the most
objectionable manifestations of the New Deal and the Fair Deal.
The blurring of party differences wrought by the beginnings of
the Cold War, the marginalization of the Right by the victory of
the Grand Alliance over fascism, the suppression of the Left by
the gathering momentum of McCarthyism—all this emboldened
the enemies of federal economic intervention, primarily but not
solely Republicans, to settle accounts.16
To be sure, the run-up to the 1952 campaign had been an
occasion for spirited and, at times, hot-tempered debate within
the major parties themselves. Supporters of Senator Robert Taft
of Ohio refused to make Eisenhower’s nomination unanimous at
the Republican national convention in Chicago. Harry Truman’s
decision to step down sparked a struggle for power among the
Democrats as well—the wounds of the “Dixiecrat” rebellion still
festering after the party’s improbable victory in 1948. The
president’s choice of Illinois governor Adlai Stevenson as his
successor eased tensions in the four-way race for the nomination
that emerged between Averell Harriman (governor of New York),
Estes Kefauver (senator from Tennessee), Richard Russell
(senator from Georgia), and Stevenson himself. But in the final
analysis, on election day, Eisenhower’s thirty-three million votes,
then the largest popular tally in a presidential canvass, signaled
what some pundits referred to as “the revolt of the moderates”
and the start of what the president-elect himself hoped would be
a “Second Era of Good Feelings.” No matter how the 1952
returns were read, it was clear that, in the wake of Roosevelt’s
reconfiguration of his party, one of the great transformations of
American political history had taken hold: on the one side, the
party of Jefferson, the defender of states’ rights and localism, had
in short order become the champion of federal authority and
centralized power; on the other, the party born of the nineteenthcentury crisis of the Union, the vanguard of a modern
administrative state, stood as a resolute critic of Washington’s
increasing presence in almost every aspect of the nation’s life.17
Unlike any other industrialized nation in the world at the

16
17

Id. at 115.
Id. at 115–16.
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time, the United States met the 1950’s with an economy not only
physically intact but also organizationally and technologically
robust. The demographic echoes of war set the stage for
acceleration in the rate of population growth, while the labor
market effects of demobilization surprisingly sparked a rise in
wages and incomes. Rapid and profitable conversion to domestic
production was further engrossed by foreign demand—most
vividly and poignantly emanating from those regions most
devastated by the war itself—for the products of American
industry and agriculture. As for international finance, the nation
stood as creditor virtually to the entire world, and the dollar,
both by default and by the multilateral agreement first reached
by the Allied nations at Bretton Woods, had become a kind of
numeraire to a newly emergent system of global commerce. With
no small justification, the fifties and sixties would come to be
regarded as a golden age of American capitalism.18
Macroeconomic management, demanding under any
circumstances, was made substantially easier for a postwar
generation that found itself the beneficiaries of historical
circumstance. Far from solving the cruel puzzle of idle capacity
and widespread unemployment that had characterized the Great
Depression, and unlike the challenge to rationalize allocation and
maximize production in the emergency of war, the task that lay
before American economists by the mid-1950s was both more
straightforward and less difficult. More straightforward because,
thanks to both the “Keynesian revolution” in economic thought
and the policy experience derived from mobilization and war, the
relationship between individual market behavior and aggregate
outcomes was finally subject to systematic understanding. Less
difficult because, given the sturdy rebound of the economy in the
wake of World War II, there existed both the confidence (most
especially exemplified by the moderate rates of return in the
markets for Treasury bills and other government obligations) and
the means (most vividly represented by rising income tax
receipts) to realize fiscal spending targets with a minimum of
redistributive implications.19
Indeed, so optimistic were
politicians and the vast majority of economists concerning the
effectiveness of stabilization policy techniques that it became
fashionable by the early 1960s to speak of the “end of the
business cycle.”20

Id. at 117–18.
Id. at 118.
Michael A. Bernstein, A Brief History of the American Economic Association, 67
AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 1007, 1019 (2008).
18
19
20
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A remarkably prosperous decade in the United States, the
1950s were nevertheless punctuated by three recessions.
Relatively brief and mild, these downturns stood as a sturdy
challenge to mainstream macroeconomists who believed that a
new learning could make such fluctuations a thing of the past.
They also assumed, especially in the case of the last slump
(which occurred right on the eve of the 1960 presidential
campaign), a growing significance in the minds of politicians
eager to “score points” in electoral contests that had been, at
least since the thirty-fourth president’s reelection in 1956, fairly
tame. For Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy in the very
closely contested presidential race of 1960, tarring his opponent,
Vice President Richard Nixon, with the brush of the 1959
recession was a useful and ultimately successful, if decidedly
opportunistic, tactic.21
Faced with an economy the insipid performance of which had
left the unemployment rate around seven percent, the new
administration in Washington was also discomfited by middling
productivity gains in the nation’s workplaces that now weakened
America’s international trade position. What had been almost
two decades of unchallenged national supremacy in world
markets, a circumstance both facilitated and recognized by the
Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, could no longer be sustained
in the face of the revitalization of the economies of Western
Europe and Japan. As they reestablished their international
economic presence, nations like the Federal Republic of Germany
and Japan exploited the advantages of an advanced technological
base that was the outgrowth of the recent rebuilding of their
major industries. Ironically enough, they also thrived because of
their relative insulation, under international treaties and
protocols (exemplified by the erection of a “nuclear umbrella” by
the United States to forestall what was feared to be the potential
for Soviet and Chinese aggression), from the burdens of defense
spending. Consequentially, their major manufacturing sectors—
such as automobiles, electronics, and steel—became powerful
competitors with their American counterparts. Whatever the
concerns of President Kennedy’s advisors with the domestic
weaknesses of the national economy, the international context
within which these difficulties emerged could not be ignored.22
Given these fairly stark international realities, it was hardly
surprising that some of the most powerful policy makers in the
Kennedy government sought to frame the nation’s economic

21
22

PERILOUS PROGRESS, supra note 6, at 130–31.
Id. at 132–33.
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challenges with respect to global financial networks. Both
Treasury secretary Douglas Dillon and his undersecretary for
monetary affairs, Robert Roosa, regarded the growing imbalance
between imports and exports, and the potential drain on national
gold stocks of which it warned, to be the defining economic policy
problem of the New Frontier. In this assessment they were
joined by William McChesney Martin, chair of the Federal
Reserve System Board of Governors. As a central banker, Martin
was further troubled by the inflationary bias that any
deterioration in the value of the dollar (and thus in its “buying
power”) would engender. Both Treasury and the Fed were thus
of like mind that relatively high interest rates were, by late 1961
and early 1962, a desirable and appropriate goal of
administration economic policy.23
For President Kennedy’s Council of Economic Advisers,
however, no matter how customary and venerable the medicine,
the proposed monetary cure was worse than the fiscal disease.
The debate over the proper “mix” of fiscal and monetary policy
during the Kennedy administration would become emblematic of
national policy discussions through the remainder of the century.
Late in 1961, the members of the CEA began to formulate a plan
to bring unemployment down to the four percent level. In their
view, the most efficient and politically expedient method to reach
that target was through an income tax cut.
An annual
macroeconomic growth target of five percent had been made part
of the party’s convention platform at Los Angeles.24
For this purpose, lead presidential economic advisor Walter
Heller’s adroit skill in rendering policy argument as graceful
prose linked up well with his colleague James Tobin’s sharply
honed analytical instincts. Turning to another White House staff
economist Arthur Okun, Tobin asked his former Yale colleague to
estimate, if possible, the relationship between the level of
unemployment and the magnitude of the gross national product.
Out of that statistical protocol emerged “Okun’s Law,” a rather
straightforward calculation which showed that for every one
percent reduction in unemployment there could be garnered
(through direct impacts on levels of output and indirect
reductions in the “underemployment” of contracted labor in slack
times) a three percent increase in national product.25 In
President Kennedy, Heller and his colleagues found a
sympathetic student of the New Economics, nervous all the same

23
24
25

Id. at 133.
Id. at 133–34.
Id. at 134.
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about its political implications; in William Martin of the Federal
Reserve System, and, to a lesser extent, Douglas Dillon at
Treasury, they encountered more problematic skeptics. The
timidity of his first budget message to the Congress
notwithstanding, the president had refrained from asking for a
tax increase to supplement additional military expenditures
(between $3 and $4 billon) in the wake of the Berlin crisis.26
Taking the measure of the naysayers at Treasury and the
Federal Reserve Board had, by contrast, less to do with
persuasive argumentation premised on scholarly credentials
than with straightforward and hardheaded struggles for the
president’s ear. By far, Douglas Dillon was the easier opponent
for the New Frontiersmen of the Kennedy Administration. A
lone Republican in a Democratic cabinet, his freedom of
maneuver was already quite constrained. More to the point, so
profound was the mutual admiration between Heller and
Undersecretary Roosa that the Kennedy Council enjoyed special
access to the highest echelons in the Treasury building.27
Federal Reserve Board Chair William McChesney Martin
had neither the political obligations to President Kennedy nor
the official responsibilities to the executive branch that
constrained the conduct of Secretary of Treasury Dillon. The
“independence” of the Fed from the executive branch was the
result of both conscious intent in its founding legislation and
decades of practice among a Board of Governors whose
sensibilities were more attuned to the needs of the nation’s
banking industry than anything else. Martin had refused,
contrary to the traditional script, to offer his resignation to the
new president. By early 1963 the president encouraged his
Council of Economic Advisors to prepare, for inclusion in his 1963
budget message, the formal tax-cut proposal so long debated and
which he believed the Fed (in the person of its chair, now
comforted by his renewed term and authority) would, if not
endorse, simply tolerate. Its ultimate legacy was the Revenue
Act of 1964. Peacetime deficit spending as an explicit growth
policy of the federal government had finally come home.28
Federal intervention in the national economy, both in the
mid-nineteenth and late twentieth centuries, was the product of
unique circumstances tied to serious and threatening
developments both within and beyond the nation’s borders. The
very contexts within which powerful and unprecedented

26
27
28

Id. at 135.
Id. at 135–36
Id. at 136.
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manipulation of economic outcomes by the national government
made sense were themselves the product of singular forces of
historical change, armed conflict, geopolitical struggle, and
ideological contestation.
For particular generations of
Americans, the responsibility of the national government to take
decisive steps to influence market outcomes was forged in these
critical epochs—years during which the nation was tested,
reconfigured, and ultimately strengthened. For all these reasons,
it seems (and seemed) obvious to many that economic policy
lessons thus learned in grave moments could then be generalized
and universally applied. Even so, it is the unfortunate reality of
history that its lessons are rarely straightforward, and its
implications become complex riddles that often take generations
to unravel. As vividly demonstrated by the profound difficulty of
simply applying the jurisprudence of the Lincoln years to the
present-day War on Terrorism, the economic policy practices of
the mid to late twentieth century are clearly not directly
applicable to the exceptional challenges occasioned by the Great
Crash of 2008. Even so, by appreciating their exceptional
qualities, we are warned off of simplistic (and dangerous)
decisions—and we are reminded that, in facing dilemmas both
vexing and unnerving, our generation is hardly alone.

